ABSTRACT: For a considerable number of years, business income tax returns attested by a certified public accountant (CPA) have enjoyed special tax incentives. There has, however, been no documentary evidence to justify the existing tax incentive policy. This study, which uses a Tobit model to undertake an analysis of business income tax return data, empirically demonstrates that CPA attested tax returns are more compliant with the tax law than non-attested tax returns. This finding suggests that tax authorities should continue to promote the use of CPA attested tax returns. As well, this finding recommends the auditing of a greater proportion of non-attested returns in order to reduce the incidence of tax evasion.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to reduce the workload of the tax authorities in Taiwan, and to assist firms in meeting their tax obligations, Article 102 of the Income Tax Law prescribes that a firm may entrust a certified public accountant (CPA) to prepare, attest and file its business income tax returns. In preparing an attested tax return, the entrusted CPA is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c h e c k i n g t h e f i r m' s a c c o u n t i n g r e c o r d s a n d r e l a t e d d o c u me n t a r y e v i d e n c e , adjusting the accounting income to taxable income based on the tax law, and attaching a s i g n e d ' t a x r e t u r n a t t e s t a t i o n r e p o r t ' t o t h e t a x r e t u r n . I n c a s e s wh e r e a n a t t e s t e d r e t u r n i s selected as part of an auditing sample, tax officials generally conduct the audit based on the tax return attestation report. Only when certain abnormalities are found will the tax 1 Another important reason for the current limited use of attested tax returns is the Expanded Paper Review (EPR) system. The EPR system can be used by firms whose total amount (total receipts) of net operating revenue and gross non-operating revenue (excluding transaction gains from lands, adhered properties of lands and tax exempt income) is NT$30 million or less. Irrespective of the gains or losses that a firm has a c t u a l l y ma d e , o n c e t h e f i r m' s r e p o r t e d n e t p r o f i t r a t i o r e aches the prescribed industry p r o f i t s t a n d a r d , a n d f u l l t a x p a y me n t i s ma d e , t h e E P R s y s t e m wi l l a s s e s s t h e f i r m' s i n c o me t a x i n l i g h t o f t h e i n f o r ma t i o n a v a i l a b l e o n t h e ' p a p e r s ' p r e s e n t e d wi t h t h e t a x returns.
2 On the one hand, a firm with net losses may willingly pay tax under the EPR system in order to dispose of the time-consuming process, and perhaps even psychological anxiety, caused by dealing with tax officials; on the other hand, however, a firm which conceals a proportion of its sales receipts through its intentional failure to issue uniform invoices, can take advantage of the EPR system to pay a much lower level of tax than the amount which would be assessed through auditing its accounting records and related documents.
If the evidence suggests a greater level of compliance with the tax law among CPA attested tax returns than ordinary tax returns, then tax return attestation clearly does achieve the goal of reducing the workload of tax authorities. Accordingly, it would then be advisable for the Ministry of Finance to expand the tax return attestation system, for example, to firms with net sales over NT$80 million, as opposed to the current standard of NT$100 million. It would also seem sensible for the Ministry of Finance to narrow the scope of the EPR system, for example, to firms with total receipts of less than NT$20 million, from the current NT$30 million.
3 It also seems reasonable for the Legislative Yuan to propose an early amendment to the Income Tax Law to allow for the imposition of penalties against those firms whose tax returns are not attested by a CPA in disregard of the tax regulations. The empirical results of this paper may, therefore, offer some relevant evidence and guidance in the formulation of tax policy in the Ministry of Finance and the Legislative Yuan.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the e x i s t i n g wo r k o n t a x e v a s i o n a n d t h e a t t e s t a t i o n o f T a i wa n e s e c o mp a n i e s ' t a x r e t u r n s . T h e methodology adopted for this study is introduced in Section 3, along with the data source of the study. The empirical results are presented in detail in Section 4, with Section 5 offering concluding remarks.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Ever since the 1970s, tax evasion has attracted considerable attention on a worldwide scale among academic researchers and tax policy makers. More recently, some of this attention has begun to focus upon the effect on tax evasion behavior of the tax services provided by CPAs. This section briefly reviews the previous work on tax evasion related topics. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented one of the earliest and most famous theoretical studies on tax evasion. Their model, a straightforward application of individual choice under expected utility theory, aimed to determine the effect on tax evasion of government instruments, such as changes in the penalty for evasion, audit probability and tax rates. Among the main findings, it was noted that under-reported income drops as the government increases the penalty rate or the probability of audit. However, their theoretical analysis failed to determine the emergence of any clear-cut relationship between tax rate and reported income.
As a pioneering example of the empirical study of tax evasion, the work of actually has. The sales revenue is decided according to the total amount shown on the uniform invoices issued by the firm. All of the uniform invoices throughout Taiwan must be pre-numbered and consequently controlled by the Ministry of Finance. 3 A firm whose total receipts exceed NT$20 million is then deprived of using the EPR system, and it may decide to opt for tax return attestation.
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Taiwan Accounting Review October 2000 Clotfelter (1983) used 1969 data from the US I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e S e r v i c e ' s T a x p a y e r Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) to investigate the relationship between marginal tax rate and individual income tax evasion, with the difference between assessed and reported income being used as a proxy for evasion. One of the most important empirical findings was that marginal tax rate had a significantly positive association with tax evasion. Since there was no evidence of evasion in a sizable proportion of the observations, the dependent variable was censored at zero, and Clotfelter, therefore, a d o p t e d T o b i t r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s . T h i s p a p e r , l i k e C l o t f e l t e r ' s , wi l l e mp l o y t h e T o b i t model for statistical analysis. Based on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Chang and Schultz (1990) proposed that differential tax compliance exists between taxpayers with additional tax due (under-withheld) at filing time, and taxpayers who are due to receive tax refunds (over-withheld). Using the 1982 TCMP data, they provided evidence consistent with their proposition. More recently, Yaniv (1999) also applied the prospect theory to a theoretical model to mathematically demonstrate that advance tax payments will affect the decision to evade tax. Following on from Chang and Schultz (1990) , the present study will exami n e wh e t h e r a f i r m' s r e f u n d -due or balance-due position at filing time has an impact on business income tax evasion. Beck et al. (1991) utilized an experimental design to explore the under-reported income of taxpayers under different tax rates, penalty rates, and audit probabilities, and under different levels of income uncertainty. Among their findings, they reported that tax compliance rises with penalty rate and audit probability, but that there is no identifiable r e l a t i o n s h i p wi t h t h e t a x p a y e r ' s t a x r a te. Risk averse taxpayers will be more compliant when the uncertainty of income is increased (i.e., when the tax law becomes more ambiguous).
Turning to the studies on the impact of the role of CPAs on tax evasion, Klepper et al. (1991) argued that since tax professionals (e.g., CPAs and lawyers in the US) are subject to disciplinary sanctions for willful or negligent breach of tax rules, they will undoubtedly help to enforce the clear requirements of the tax law. However, since tax professionals are also more astute and knowledgeable than the general public in terms of finding ways to exploit the tax law, they will also help taxpayers take advantage of any ambiguous provisions of the law. Klepper et al. (1991) , therefore, present a theoretical model, which jointly addresses the decision to engage a tax professional and the tax evasion outcomes conditional on whether a professional is engaged. However, only the latter is empirically tested. The 1982 TCMP data is used in the test, and ambiguity is measured using the number of revenue rulings pertaining to the line item, divided by the true amount of that line item. The test results were basically as they had predicted; that is, where ambiguous line items are involved, tax professionals will play an advocacy role, thus contributing to greater evasion, whereas, in the case of unambiguous line items, such professionals will play an enforcement role, contributing to greater compliance. Survey studies also present similar results. In an experiment using the partners and managers of the (then) Big 6 CPA firms as subjects, Spilker et al. (1999) provided evidence to show that tax professionals will interpret ambiguity to the benefit of their clients in a compliance decision context. Based on the 1982 TCMP data, Erard (1993) also found that returns prepared by tax professionals were more aggressive in tax evasion than returns Suming Lin--CPA Attested Tax Returns and Tax Evasion 19 prepared by taxpayers themselves. However, in contrast to Klepper et al. (1991) and Erard (1993) , who examined personal income tax evasion, this paper concentrates on business income tax.
T h e r e h a v e a l s o b e e n s o me s t u d i e s i n v e s t i g a t i n g t a x e v a s i o n , o r a C P A ' s t a x s e r v i c e s , in Taiwan. Huang (1982) compared personal income in the national income accounts, and the income reported in all of the individual income tax returns, concluding that around 71% of income was unreported by taxpayers in the 1979 tax year. Again based on national income accounts, Chen (1987) found that around 53% of business income was unreported in 1983 business income tax returns. The proportion of under-reported income was also found to vary among different industries in Taiwan.
C h u ( 1 9 8 8 ) i n t e r v i e we d 5 4 o f T a i wa n ' s C P As i n a n a t t e mp t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e p o s s i b l e factors that cause businesses to evade tax. According to his MIMIC (multiple-indicator-multiple-cause) analysis, significant indicators of business income tax evasion include the quality and integrity of tax officials, the tax rate structure, and the flexible interpretation of the tax law. However, the role played by a CPA in tax evasion was beyond the scope of his research. Wang et al. (1993) conducted a questionnaire survey and held panel discussions to examine the benefits of using CPA attested tax returns. Their main findings, as they relate to this paper were: (i) the reasons f o r u s i n g C P A t a x a t t e s t a t i o n i n c l u d e d ' a g o o d b a r g a i n t o e n t r u s t t a x a t t e s t a t i o n a l o n g wi t h f i n a n c i a l a t t e s t a t i o n ' , ' c a n e n j o y t a x p r e f e r e n c e s ' , ' r e q u i r e d b y t a x r e g u l a t i o n s ' , e t c . ; ( i i ) a p p r o x i ma t e l y 6 6 % o f C P A a t t e s t e d t a x r e t u r n s were selected for subsequent tax audit, while 57% of ordinary returns were selected; and (iii) in the opinion of tax officials and businesses, CPA tax attestation has played a positive role -CPAs can assist firms to fulfill their tax obligations and simultaneously safeguard th e f i r ms ' i n t e r e s t s .
I n a d d i t i o n , t a x a t t e s t a t i o n r e d u c e s t a x a u t h o r i t i e s ' a u d i t workload and costs.
While the Wang et al. (1993) study utilized a survey approach; the present study will employ micro-unit data from real tax returns to investigate any specific association between CPA tax attestation and business income tax evasion.
III. METHODOLOGY Data and Sample
Business income tax returns filed for the tax year 1994 are used as the data for this study. The Data Processing Center of the Ministry of Finance maintains an annual record, on computer disks, of reported amounts of all items on original tax returns, and the a mo u n t s d e e me d ' c o r r e c t ' f o l l o wi n g a u d i t b y t a x a u t h o r i t i e s .
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The filing modes of all business income tax returns reported for the 1994 tax year are shown in Table 1 , revealing that around half a million returns were filed in Taiwan during that year, and that most returns, around 63.4%, used the Expanded Paper Review (EPR) system. Those firms with total operating and non-operating receipts not exceeding NT$30 million, which could opt to use the EPR system, but chose not to, accounted for 18.8% of the total returns. The combination of these two groups indicates that more than 80% of all returns came from businesses with total receipts not exceeding NT$30 million. Only around 45,000 firms, less than 10% of the total, entrusted their tax returns to CPA attestation.
The sample for statistical analysis excludes firms with total receipts not exceeding NT$30 million, since they have the option of applying the EPR system and records in the EPR returns are often incomplete. Firms whose net sales were equal to, or greater than, NT$100 million are also eliminated from the sample because they are compelled to use CPA attested tax returns under current tax regulations. Table 2 demonstrates the sample selection procedure. The numbers displayed in the second row are taken from Table 1 , and after eliminating the firms with total receipts not exceeding NT$30 million and those firms with net sales of NT$100 million and above, we are left with 14,998 CPA attested tax returns, and 22,321 ordinary returns. Firms that did not report balance sheet data, those for which tax assessed data after official audits were unavailable, or those that included missing or illogical values are further deleted from the sample. 5 In the final stage, the sample consists of 34,356 observations, including 14,082 CPA attested tax returns (41%) and 20,274 ordinary returns (59%).
6 Table 3 divides the CPA attested returns and ordinary returns selected in the sample into two groups, respectively; those firms within which tax evasion was subsequently found in an official audit (defined below), and those firms not found to have been involved in any tax evasion. Of those firms using ordinary returns, there were 11,548 that were found to have evaded taxes, far more than the 2,904 firms that had used CPA attested returns that were found to be evading taxes. 5 The Data Processing Center retains business income returns data in three files: Income Statements, Balance Sheets and Tax Assessed after Audits. These files can be merged accor d i n g t o e a c h f i r m' s 8 -digit business identification number assigned by the government. Before the Data Processing Center releases the data for academic research, the identification number is transformed by a certain formula unknown to the public. 6 There are 163 firms with reported tax liability greater than the assessed tax liability after audit. They are deemed as erroneous observations and deleted from the sample. Note: In this table, receipts means total receipts, and stands for the total amount of net operating revenue (net sales) and gross non-operating revenue (excluding transaction gains from land and adhered properties of land, and tax-exempt income). In those firms within which tax evasion had been assessed, the average tax evasion from ordinary returns was NT$266,285, far in excess of the average NT$171,721 of the CPA attested returns, by around NT$95,000 (the average reported tax liability was NT$189,000 for ordinary returns, and NT$195,000 for CPA attested returns).
Variables
Since all firms in the sample were restricted to total receipts in excess of NT$30 million, and net sales of less than NT$100 million, the amount of tax evasion is necessarily limited within a certain range. Therefore, the amount of tax evasion, as the dependent variable, will not be taken logarithmically or transformed into any other value. This will also ensure a much easier explanation of the statistical results. All the variables used in this study are listed in Table 4 below, followed by complementary explanations where necessary.
While under-reported income was used as the proxy of tax evasion by both Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Clotfelter (1983) , this study defines tax evasion as the amount of assessed additional tax, i.e., the tax liability that tax officials determined to be 22 Taiwan Accounting Review October 2000 due, less the tax liability of the reported taxable income. Using assessed additional tax as the dependent variable, it is considered that this paper can more clearly demonstrate the association between the independent variables and the magnitude of the tax evaded. Tax e v a s i o n i n c l u d e s n o t o n l y ' i n t e n t i o n a l ' t a
a y e r s ' a d v a n t a g e o u s interpretations of the tax law. In other words, in this study, tax evasion includes both intentional and unintentional non-payment of taxes. However, over-reported expenses and under-reported receipts that the tax officials failed to discover in their subsequent audits are not included in the definition of tax evasion. T h e r a n k , f r o m s ma l l e s t t o l a r g e s t , o f a f i r m' s n e t s a l e s a mo n g a l l t h e f i r ms i n t h e s a me National Tax Administration, divided by the number of firms, multiplied by 100 to get a percentage. IND1 1 for agricultural, forestry, fishing, animal husbandry, mining or metallurgical firms, hydropower plants, electricity-power plants, or gas works, 0 otherwise. Notes: 1. The industry categorization is pursuant to the 6-digit industry code promulgated by the Ministry of Finance. Although IND2 is reserved for firms in the manufacturing industry, it is not used as a dummy variable in the statistical analysis to avoid the singularity matrix problem. 2. Financial and insurance companies are not included in the sample because they are required to use CPA attested tax returns.
The coefficient of the dummy variable CPAD will be used to test whether the tax Suming Lin--CPA Attested Tax Returns and Tax Evasion   23 evasion of CPA attested returns differs from that of ordinary returns. As the extant literature has failed to provide a clear-cut theory capable of predicting the impact of CPA tax services on tax compliance, this study will try to investigate the association, rather than the causality, between the usage of CPA attested returns and tax evasion. B a s e d o n Ka h n e ma n a n d T v e r s k y ' s ( 1 9 7 9 ) p r o s p e c t t h e o r y , C h a n g a n d S c h u l t z (1990) hypothesize that at filing time, individual taxpayers will assume their withholding position, i.e., whether under-withheld or over-withheld, as their reference point. Therefore, taxpayers with an under-withheld (tax balance due) position have a higher rate of tax evasion than taxpayers with an over-withheld (tax refund due) position. Simply because Chang and Schultz (1990) were able to present supporting evidence from US individual income tax data, the withholding position (the dummy variable PAY) will be used as an independent variable in this study.
A further independent variable, ETR (effective tax rate), is obtained by subtracting the applicable tax credits from the tax liability of the assessed taxable income, and then dividing this by the total assessed taxable and exempt income. When the denominator is less than or equal to zero, or when it is positive but the numerator is negative, the ETR is set at zero. Clotfelter (1983) found that US taxpayers with a higher marginal tax rate (MTR, rather than ETR), tended to have more income under-reported. Theoretically, MTR is more suitable than ETR as the explanatory variable of tax evasion; this is because, for a taxpayer to increase his under-reported income by $1, his tax saving, if not detected b y t a x o f f i c i a l s , wi l l b e t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f MT R ( $ MT R ) . Ho we v e r , wh e r e a f i r m' s a n n u a l taxable income is over NT$100,000, the applicable tax rate will be 25% (the highest in
T a i wa n ) . S i n c e i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e v a r i a t i o n o f f i r ms ' MT R wi l l b e q u i t e s ma l l , t h i s s t u d y
uses ETR rather than MTR as an explanatory variable. Firms with more tax exempt income or more tax credits have a lower ETR, and these firms may well prove to be more compliant to the tax law because their tax burden is already low. Therefore, the conjecture is that ETR and tax evasion are positively related.
The more widespread the ownership, then the less the possibility that the benefits of business income tax evasion can be shared among a small number of people (for example, the management team). Tax return data maintained by the Data Processing Center, however, lacks information on the number of shareholders, or the proportion of shares held by the board of directors. Therefore, this study can only consider whether a firm is a limited corporation (limited by shares) as the proxy for the dispersion of ownership. If a firm is limited by shares then ORG=1, otherwise ORG=0 (e.g., for a partnership, a sole proprietorship, or a corporation in any other form).
A f i r m' s f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n ma y i mp a c t u p o n i t s t a x c o mp l i a n c e b e h a v i o r . A f i r m with a higher quick ratio (QUIC) has more funds available in the short term, therefore, it has less cash outflow pressure impacting upon income tax payment, and may, therefore, h a v e a l o we r p r o p e n s i t y t o p l a y t h e t a x e v a s i o n g a me . C o n v e r s e l y , t h e h i g h e r a f i r m' s d e b t ratio, the greater its interest expenses and bankruptcy risk and the lower its tax paying ability, thus, the higher will be its propensity to evade tax. In order to avoid any zeros arising in the denominator of the QUIC calculation, both the numerator and the denominator are increased by NT$10,000, similar to the manipulation carried out in Broman (1989) , and to avoid the extreme impact of the outliers, QUIC takes the quick ratio in natural logarithmic form. The debt ratio denoted by DEBT is total liability (plus 24 Taiwan Accounting Review October 2000 NT$10,000) divided by total assets (plus NT$10,000), which then takes natural logarithm.
I R S 1 , …, I R S 5 a r e t h e d u mmy v a r i a b l e s f o r t h e t a x o f f i c e -in-charge. The Tobit model in the study has no constant term, so five dummies are taken to represent all five national tax administrations. In addition, all firms are classified into seven industry categories, according to the 6-digit industry code. (Refer to the notes in Table 4 for more information on industry codes).
A unique variable used in this study is RANK. Assume, for example, that a firm is under the jurisdiction of the National Tax Administration of the Southern Taiwan Province. This study ranks its net sales with every other firm in the same jurisdiction. If the firm ranks R th largest among the whole S firms in that tax jurisdiction, then its RANK = (1-R/S) ×100. It is speculated that a firm with larger RANK has a higher probability of selection for audit by the tax office-in-charge, and that the tax office will scrutinize its tax return more closely. Therefore, it is predicted that RANK will be positively associated with the amount of tax evasion detected by the tax office. The last column in Table 5 demonstrates the sample mean of each independent variable; this information is indispensable in the explanation of the results of Tobit analysis.
Statistical Model
As Table 3 indicated, there were 19,904 firms (about 58% of the sample), which were not found to have evaded tax. Therefore, the dependent variable, i.e., the amount of tax evasion, was observed to be zero in a sizable proportion of the sample. Economists r e f e r
t o t h i s k i n d o f d a t a a s ' c e n s o r e d d a t a ' ( f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n wi l l f o l l o w) . I n h i s
research on the household demand for durable goods, Tobin (1958) proposed a new statistical model to analyze his censored data. The model, designated as the Tobit model by Goldberger (1964) , has been widely employed in social science research (Amemiya 1984) , such as the Greene and Quester (1982) study of the working hours of female laborers, the Clotfelter (1983) examination of US tax evasion in individual income tax, and the Lin (1997) study of R&D expenditure by Taiwanese manufacturers.
Similar to the argument in Tobin (1958) , different firms may have different propensities towards tax evasion, even though they are not found to have evaded tax. Therefore, what we observe for the dependent variable y i (the evaded tax) is:
where y * (the propensity to evade tax) is the latent variable, and:
If y i * ＞0, the observed tax evasion is y i =y i * . If y i * ≦0, only y i =0 is observed, and the exact value of y i * is not observed. For example, even if firms A and B are both observed to have no tax evasion (y A ＝y B ＝0), firm A may have a greater propensity towards evading tax (y A * ＞y B * ). Once business conditions are changed, y A * may exceed zero at greater speed than y B * so that y A >0 will be observed while y B is still equal to zero. Based on the explanations of the Tobit model in Greene (2000: Ch.20) , Maddala (1983: Ch.6 ) and Judge et al. (1985: Ch.18 ), the following four equations derived from otherwise,
Suming Lin--CPA Attested Tax Returns and Tax Evasion   25 equations (1) and (2) are critical to this study:
where (．) andΦ(．) are notations for the standard normal density function and cumulative normal distribution function, respectively; x ij is the value of the j th variable in the i th observation vector (the i th firm); and z = β x i /σ, the standard normal deviate. Equation (3) is related to y>0 only. Given x=x i , it is the expected value of tax evasion for those noncompliant firms (y>0), while those firms with y=0 are excluded. As indicated in Judge et al. (1985:780) , the traditional least squares regression will result in biased and inconsistent   (the estimator of β). This is because the second term in equation (3) is ignored. Given x=x i , equation (4) represents the marginal effect of a unit increase in the j th variable of x ij vector on the expected value of y i for those tax evading firms only. Because this takes into account only the firms with y>0, it ignores the fact that the x ij c h a n g e ma y c a u s e s o me f i r ms ' p r o p e n s i t y f o r e v a s i o n t o i n c r e a s e f r o m y i * ≦0 to y i * >0, i.e., to become tax evaders from non-evaders. On the other hand, equation (5) represents the overall expected value of tax evasion not only for the y>0 firms, but also for the y=0 firms. Equation (6) is the partial derivative function of equation (5), and this study will use equation (6) to predict the effect of a unit increase in the independent variable on the marginal increase in the tax evasion from both firms that already evaded tax, and those firms that had not been tax evaders but that would subsequently become evaders. Thus, Equation (6), rather than equation (4), plays the main role in this study because it carries more relevant tax implications.
The LIMDEP 7.0 software (Greene, 1995) is used for the maximum likelihood estimation of the Tobit model. As stated above, the partial derivative in equation (6) will be used to predict the marginal effect of independent variables. Although the marginal effects can be calculated for any pertinent values of the regressors, this study primarily calculates this at the means of the regressors ( x ). However, for dummy variables (e.g., CPAD, PAY, and ORG) the partial derivative is not meaningful. Instead, taking CPAD as an example, we apply equation (5) to compute the marginal effect as follows, as was suggested in Greene (2000:817) .
IV.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS Table 5 summarizes the Tobit regression results, with the second column presenting the estimated β coefficients, and the third column offering the t-statistics. Unlike cases in the linear model, theβcoefficients of the Tobit model, which is nonlinear, are not the marginal effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. According to equation (6), the marginal effects for continuous regressors are the β coefficients multiplied by Φ(β x /σ), and these are shown in the fourth column of Table 5 . However, the marginal effects of the dummy variables (CPAD, PAY, and ORG) are computed by equation (7). The last column provides the sample means of the independent variables. The means and the σvalue of equation (2) shown in Note 2 of Table 5 are indispensable to the computation of values in columns four and five. Taking IRS1 as an example, the   x y | E =106,812 in the second last column represents that for all sampled firms under the jurisdiction of the National Tax Administration of Taipei (IRS=1,IRS2=…=IRS5=0), the average amount of tax evasion estimated at the means of all regressors, with the exception of tax jurisdiction dummies, is NT$106,812.
The most important objective of this study was to undertake a comparison of business income tax evasion between CPA attested tax returns and ordinary returns. The Tobit analysis shows that the β coefficient of CPAD is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The fourth column of Table 5 , also demonstrates that the marginal effect of CPAD is -NT$110,081; that is, setting all the independent variables except CPAD at their mean values, using these conditions as the base point for comparison, then on average, CPA attested tax returns under these conditions evaded less tax by about NT$110,000 than ordinary tax returns under the same conditions. Therefore, the empirical results provide supporting evidence for tax incentive policies, such as allowing extra deductible entertainment expenses, in order to promote the use of CPA tax return attestation. On the other hand, Wang et al. (1993) , and several tax officials in various national tax administration offices, indicated that the audit probabilities were the same for CPA attested returns and ordinary returns. Therefore, the empirical results also indicate that reinforcing the tax audit of ordinary returns may uncover more tax evasion, and enhance tax equity.
The coefficient of PAY is significantly greater than zero, and the marginal effect is NT$131,964, implying that firms with tax balances due at filing time evaded more tax than those firms with tax refunds due. This finding demonstrates that, similar to the evidence documented by Chang and Schultz (1990) in the case of US individual income taxes, the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ) is applicable to the reporting of T a i wa n ' s b u s i n e s s i n c o me t a x .
The coefficient o f E T R i s a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r t h a n z e r o . I f a f i r m' s e f f e c t i v e tax rate increases by 1%, its tax evasion increases by about NT$524, as suggested by the fourth column of Table 5 . This finding runs parallel to the Clotfelter (1983) study in which the individual income tax rate was found to be positively associated with under-reported income in the US. The CPAs interviewed in Chu (1988) also claimed, similarly, that a high rate of income tax was one of the main causes of tax evasion in Taiwan.
As the proxy of the dispersion of ownership, ORG is the only variable whose coefficient is not statistically significant. Although this result does not support the hypothesis that firms with dispersed ownership have less motivation to evade tax, it is worth reiterating that ORG may be an imperfect proxy of the dispersion of ownership, as stated earlier.
The coefficient of RANK is significantly positive, with the marginal effect being NT $ 8 , 3 1 1 . T h i s i mp l i e s t h a t i f t h e r a n k o f o n e f i r m' s n e t s a l e s i s o n e p e r c e n t a g e point higher than another, then its tax evasion will be about NT$8,300 higher. This finding supports the earlier proposition that a firm with a larger RANK has a higher probability of selection for audit by the tax office-in-charge, and that the tax office will scrutinize its tax returns more closely. The finding is also consistent with the argument of the political cost hypothesis in Zimmerman (1983) . Table 5 Tobit analysis of business income tax evasion -217,751, n=34,356, σ=499,460 (see Greene, (1995) , at p.587).
S t a n d i n g f o r a f i r m' s f i n a n c i a l s t r e n g t h , a s e x p e c t e d , QUI C ( q u i c k r a t i o ) i s f o u n d t o be negatively associated with tax evasion. However, DEBT (debt ratio) is somewhat unexpectedly, also negatively associated with tax evasion. This contradicts the prediction that a firm with high debt ratio has a lower tax paying ability, and thus a higher propensity towards tax evasion. This study made an effort to delete the outliers, i.e.,
28
Taiwan Accounting Review October 2000 observations with DEBT less than ln (1/1000), but the regression results are still similar to those in Table 5 . A possible explanation for the negative relationship between DEBT and tax evasion is as follows; other things being equal, a high leveraged firm has a higher interest expense, thus lowering its taxable income and tax liability. Since its tax liability is already low (or is zero due to interest expense exceeding operation income), there is less motivation to evade tax.
Likelihood ratio tests have been employed in this study to investigate whether the j u r i s d i c t i o n d u mmi e s , I R S 1 , I R S 2 , …, I R S 5 , o r t h e i n d u s t r y d u mmi e s , I ND1 , I ND3 , …, IND7, or indeed both, can be discarded from the model specification. However, the test results all suggest that both jurisdiction and industry dummies have to be specified in the Tobit model. Furthermore, since the coefficients of all the jurisdiction dummies are quite close to one another, this study has attempted to impose the equality restriction on the coefficients (Greene 1995:134-136) . The likelihood ratio test also rejects the equality constraint.
Although the  coefficients of the jurisdiction dummies are all negative, the expected tax evasion E(y-x) within each jurisdiction is consistently positive. This is because E(y-x) has two components in equation (5); its first termβ xΦ(z), which may be negative due to negative coefficients, is less than the second termσ (z), which is positive, in magnitude. Among the five tax jurisdictions, firms under the National Tax Administration of Taipei have the largest average tax evasion, followed by firms under the National Tax Administration of Southern Taiwan Province. A possible explanation to this finding is that firms in these two areas are more inclined to evade tax, but an alternative is that these two tax offices have better trained tax officials and thus have better audit performance. It would be a worthwhile study for tax analysts and policy-makers to further explore the relationship between the training of tax officials and the performance of tax offices. As indicated in Chen (1987) , under-reported income varies significantly among different industries; column five of Table 5 also demonstrates that tax evasion varies with different industries.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The basic contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence supporting the proposition that CPA attested business income tax returns evade less tax than ordinary returns. This finding indicat e s t h a t a C P A ' s t a x a t t e s t a t i o n s e r v i c e s c a n h e l p f i r ms t o f u l f i l l their tax obligations, and that this supports the use of tax policies offering incentives. On the other hand, the empirical results of this study also imply that a transfer of some of the effort from the auditing of CPA attested returns, towards the scrutiny of ordinary returns, may uncover more tax evasion, and thus enhance overall tax equity.
Turning to the administrative policy on tax return filing, this study suggests that the scope of CPA attested tax returns should be extended to include more firms. According to t h e ' Me a s u r e s Go v e r n i n g t h e C P A T a x R e t u r n s At t e s t a t i o n E n t r u s t e d b y P r o f i t -seeking E n t e r p r i s e s ' p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e Mi n i s t r y o f F i n a n c e i n 1 9 8 2 , a f i r m wi t h n e t s a l e s o f NT$100 million or more, should entrust a CPA to attest its tax return. Since the mid-1980s, the pass rates of CPA examinations have been significantly higher than in the preceding period, indicating therefore, that there are currently sufficient CPAs to match
